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SELECTED TITLE ISSUES IN TITLE EXAMINATION
I.

TEXAS PROPERTY 101
(A)

Separate Property

Section 3.001 of the Texas Fam ily Code provides that:
A spouse's separate property consists of: (1) the property owned or claimed
by the spouse before marriage; (2) the property acquired by the spouse during
marriage by gift, devise or descent; and, (3) the recovery for personal injury
sustained by the spouse during m arriage, except any recovery for lose of earning
capacity during m arriage.
Each spouse has the sole m anagem ent, control and disposition of his or her
separate property. S ee Section 3.101 of the Texas Family Code.

(B)

Community Property

Section 3 .0 02 of the Texas Fam ily Code provides that:
Community property consists of the property, other than separate
property, acquired by either spouse during marriage.
Property possessed by either spouse during or on dissolution of marriage is
presumed to be community property. The degree of proof necessary to establish
that property is separate property is clear and convincing evidence. S ee Section
3.003 of the Texas Fam ily Code.
W hile these definitions ap pear simple, they have given rise to a lot of
litigation. The annotations contained in the code alone are about 150 pages.
Generally, income from separate property is community property. But royalty
income is held to be a sale of the property, that is a sale of the corpus and is not
income. Royalties from separate property is separate property. The sam e is true
for lease bonuses. H ow ever, d elay rentals are likened to rent and is community
property.
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(C)

Inception of Title

Under this rule, Texas courts determine the separate or community nature of
property at the time of acquisition. Inception of title occurs when a party first has the
right of claim to property by virtue of which title is finally vested. Weirzchula v.
Weirzchula, 623 S.W .2d 730 (Tex.App. 1981).
It is well established that a claim to real property can arise before the legal
title or evidence of title has been attained. Welder v. Lambert, 91 Tex. 510 44
S .W .2d 281 (Tex. 1898). In other words, if you acquire a contract giving you the
right to acquire land before you are married, the property will be your separate
property even if the condition of the contract is not met until during marriage. In the
Lambert case, the earnest money date was prior to the date of marriage and the
court held that the claim of right to the property occurred before marriage and
therefore, was the separate property of the person to whom the land was conveyed.
If land is conveyed to you under a vendor's lien deed in which you pay part of
the m oney down with the remainder to be paid over a number of years and you
subsequently get married and community property funds are used to pay off the
mortgage, the land would still be your separate property.
A presumption that property is community estate arises when the note is
signed after the marriage. This is because a debt acquired by either spouse during
m arriage is presumptively a community debt. However, this presumption is also
rebuttable. If the lendor agrees only to look to the separate property of one of the
spouses for the security of the debt, the proof will rebut the presumption.

(D)

Management, Control And Disposition of Marital Property

Section 3.102 of the Texas Family Code provides as follows:
(a)

During marriage, each spouse has the sole management,
control, and disposition of the community property that he or she
would have owned if single, including but not limited to:
(1)

personal earnings;

(2)

revenue from separate property;

(3)

recoveries for personal injuries; and,
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(4)

(E)

the increase and mutations of, and the revenue from, all
property subject to his or her sole management, control,
and disposition.

(b)

If community property subject to the sole management, control,
and disposition of one spouse is mixed or combined with
community property subject to the sole management, control and
disposition of the other spouse, then the mixed or combined
community property is subject to the joint management, control,
and disposition of the spouses, unless the spouses provide
otherwise by power of attorney in writing or other agreement.

(c)

Except as provided in Subsection (a) of this section, the
community property is subject to the joint management, control
and disposition of the husband and wife, unless the spouses
provide otherwise by power of attorney in writing or other
agreement.

Protection of Third Persons

Section 3.1 04 of the Texas Family Code provides as follows:
(a)

During marriage, property is presumed to be subject to the sole
m anagement, control, and disposition of a spouse if it is held in his or
her name, as shown by muniment, contract, deposit of funds, or other
evidence of ownership, or if it is in his or her possession and is not
subject to such evidence of ownership.

(b)

A third party dealing with a spouse is entitled to rely (as against the
other spouse or anyone claiming from that spouse) on that spouse's
authority to deal with the property if:
1.

the property is presumed to be subject to the sole management,
control, and disposition of the spouse; and,

2.

the person dealing with the spouse:
A.

is not a party to a fraud upon the other spouse or another
person; and,
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B.

does not have actual or constructive notice of the spouse's lack
of authority.

For example, if a deed names one person as the grantee and that person is
married, as to third parties, the property is presumed to be subject to the sole
management, control and disposition of the spouse whose name appears as the
grantee in the deed. In such a case, a third party, such as a lessee, is entitled to rely
on the spouse's authority as long as the third party is not a party to a fraud upon the
other spouse or another person and does not have actual or constructive notice of
the spouse's lack of authority.
W hat constitutes actual or constructive notice of the spouse's lack of authority
has not been the subject of a lot of litigation. However, it has been held that where
a bank president had actual knowledge that the wife had refused to sign a note and
a deed of trust covering lands acquired as community property but held only in the
husband's name, this was sufficient to put the bank on notice of the husband’s lack
of authority to encumber the wife's interest in the tract. Williams v. Portland State
Bank (Civ.App. 1974) 514 S.W .2d 124 error granted, dismissed.
However, the mere fact that the third party knew that the person was married
does not, of itself, overcome this sole management presumption. S ee Johnson v.
Cumming , 61 6 F2d 1069 (1979). Further, even if the spouse in whose name the
deed was not executed joins in subsequent instruments affecting the title, such as
executing deeds of trust or mechanic's liens, this is insufficient to show joint
management. See Fajkus v. First National Bank o f Giddings, 735 S .W .2d 882
(Tex.App.-Austin, 1987) and Thomas v. Rhodes , 701 S.W .2d 943 (Tex.App.-1986,
writ re f'd, n.r.e.) cert. denied, 480 U.S. 9 0 6 ,1 0 7 S.Ct. 1348, 94 L.Ed.2d 519 1987.
(F)

Hom estead

W hat can constitute constructive notice that property is not subject to the sole
m anagement and control of the spouse in whose name the deed appears? The most
obvious example which comes to mind is when the husband and wife are occupying
the property as homestead. Homesteads in Texas are vigorously protected and
have a special place in the law.
Prior to January 1 , 1998, Article 16, Section 50 of the Texas State Constitution
provided as follows:
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Sec. 50.
The homestead of a family, or of a single adult
person, shall be, and is hereby protected from forced sale, for the
payment of all debts except for the purchase money thereof, or a part
of such purchase money, the taxes due thereon, or for work and
material used in constructing improvements thereon, and in this last
case only when the work and material are contracted for in writing, with
the consent of both spouses, in the case of a family homestead, given
in the same manner as is required in making a sale and conveyance of
the homestead; nor may the owner or claimant of the property claimed
as homestead, if married, sell or abandon the homestead without the
consent of the other spouse, given in such manner as m ay be
prescribed by law.
No mortgage, trust deed, or other lien on the
homestead shall ever be valid, except for the purchase money therefor,
or improvements m ade thereon, as hereinbefore provided, whether
such mortgage, or trust deed, or other lien, shall have been created by
the owner alone, or together with his or her spouse, in case the owner
is married. All pretended sales of the homestead involving any
condition of defeasance shall be void. This amendment shall becom e
effective upon its adoption.
Effectively, the only liens which were valid on a homestead were:
(1)

Purchase money mortgages or liens;

(2)

Liens for taxes due on the homestead; or,

(3)

Mechanic’s liens for constructing improvements on the hom estead but
only if these latter liens were in writing with the consent of both
spouses.

Effective January 1, 1998, the Texas Constitution was am ended to provide
that in certain circumstances, liens created under a partition or for refinancing are
effective against homesteads if the terms of the constitution are complied with.
As stated in the interpretive commentary to this Article, the homestead
exemption was a Texas creation. The direct cause of the law was the United States
Panic of 1837 and the ensuing depression during which numerous fam ilies lost
homes and farms through foreclosures. In the Republic of Texas, business becam e
stagnant, money scarce and credit unobtainable. Most Texans w ere in debt. The
homestead exemption was looked upon as a necessary measure to offset the
economic danger to Texans and Texas. It had a three-fold purpose:
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(1)

To preserve the integrity of the fam ily as the basic elem ent of social
organization, and, incidentally, to encourage colonialization for in a
frontier society each pioneer fam ily was of definite value to the
community;

(2)

To provide the debtor with a home for his fam ily and som e m eans to
support them and to recoup his economic losses so as to prevent the
family from becoming a burdensome charge upon the public; and,

(3)

To retain in pioneers the feeling of freedom and sense of independence
which was deem ed necessary to the continued existence of democratic
institutions.

Section 5.001 in Texas Family Code provides as follows:
W hether the homestead is the separate property of either
spouse or community property, neither spouse m ay sell,
convey or encumber it without the joinder of the other
spouse except as provided in this subchapter or by other
rules of law.
The exceptions provided in C hapter 5 of the Family Code include the
following:
(1)

If the homestead is the separate property of a spouse, that spouse may
file a sworn petition that gives a description of the property, states the
facts that m ake it desirable for the spouse to sell, convey or encumber
the homestead without the joinder of the other spouse and alleges that
the other spouse:
(a)

is incapacitated, whether judicially declared incapacitated or not;

(b)

disappears and his or her location remains unknown to the
petitioning spouse;

(c)

permanently abandons the homestead and the petitioning
spouse; or,
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(d)

(2)

permanently abandons the homestead and the spouses are
permanently separated, or has been reported by an executive
department of the United States to be a prisoner of w ar or
missing on public service of the United States

This exceptions require a court order and the provisions of Chapter 5
of the Family Code must be complied with.

If you obtain an oil and gas lease covering homestead property from only the
spouse who is presumed to have the sole management and control thereof or from
the spouse who owns the property as his or her sole property, the lease will be
inoperative as long as the property remains the homestead of the lessors unless the
other spouse ratifies the lease or is otherwise estopped from denying its validity.
See Grissom v. Anderson 79 S.W .2d 619 (Tex. 1935).
In the Grissom case, eight brothers and sisters, who w ere the joint owners of
a tract of land, executed an oil and gas lease. Tw o of the joint owners, Frank and
Taylor occupied the land as their homestead with their wives and families. The
interest of Frank and Taylor was their separate property. The wives did not join in
the execution of this lease even though they knew all about the lease and w ere
willing to execute it if the parties thought it was necessary to m ake it effective.
The court in that case held that it was unquestioned that the lease was valid
and binding on all parties signing same except Taylor and Frank and their wives.
Without the signatures of the wives of Taylor and Frank, the mineral lease was
inoperative as long as the land constituted their homestead. Under the law, the
power to m ake it operative as to their interest rested exclusively with them.
However, the court noted that after the execution of the lease, Taylor and
Frank and their wives had executed various royalty deeds which stated that the
deeds were subject to the lease. The Texas Supreme Court held that by their acts
in executing the royalty deeds, they gave the lease life. In other words, their acts in
executing the royalty deed and making the deed subject to the lease constituted a
ratification of the lease.
In order to effectuate a ratification, the Texas courts have held that there must
be a writing duly acknowledged by the non-joining spouse. The acceptance of
royalty proceeds under a lease does not effect the ratification or, considered alone,
constitute an estoppel. S ee Crews v. General Crude Oil Company (Civ.App. 1956)
287 S .W .2d 243.

SELECTED TITLE ISSUES IN TITLE EXAMINATION

PAGE 7

In the Crews case, supra, the wife had signed a lease but argued that her
signature was not properly acknowledged. H er testimony, in essence, w as that the
landman had come to her house, she had signed the lease and the landm an had
then taken it elsewhere for the acknowledgment. Th e landm an and the notary both
testified that they went together to the wife's house and that she signed th e lease
there and then acknowledged her execution of the lease as the law requires. The
jury believed the wife and found that her signature w as not acknow ledged.
Two years after the execution of the lease, the lessee's successors drilled a
well and some 22 months after the well was drilled, suit w as filled in a trespass to
try title.
The court stated that by acceptance of the royalties, the w ife w a s not estopped
to deny the validity of the lease. Further, the m ere inaction and silence on her part
in watching the well drilled without any affirmative representations or suppression
of facts was not of itself enough to hold the wife w as estopped from denying the
validity of the lease.
However, the evidence showed that the lessees had fenced off the a re a where
the well was located with a locked gate to which the husband and w ife had no
access. As to that part of the lease which had been so fenced off, the court found
that the husband and wife had abandoned that portion as th eir hom estead.
However, the lease w as not abandoned as to that portion of the lands covered by the
lease which were outside this fenced area. All facts determ ine the outcom e.
At the time the Crews case, supra, w as decided, T exas law required that in
order to be a valid acknowledgment of the wife, a notary would have to ta k e the wife
apart from her husband and, in private, fully explain the docum ent to the w ife. The
wife would then have to acknowledge her signature to the docum ent, declare she
had willingly signed it for the purposes and consideration expressed in the document
and that she did not wise to retract it. If a spouse does not sign a lease (or other
instrument) covering a homestead, it will be ineffective. In this case, you will be
forced to look to other factors and prove the document is binding on the nonsignatory spouse.
In sum, when dealing with community property, it alw ays better to have a
husband and wife both execute a lease regardless of how record title stands. This
is imperative where the property is the homestead of the husband and w ife. Anytime
you are leasing a person’s mineral interest and that person owns th e surface, or an
interest therein, you should check to see if the property is a hom estead of that
person. However, if the property is not the homestead of the husband and wife and
SELECTED TITLE ISSUES IN TITLE EXAMINATION
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the land w as conveyed to only one spouse, then a lease taken from that spouse will
be valid to bind the entire comm unity interest unless you a re a party to a fraud or
have actual or constructive notice that said property is not subject to sole
m anagem ent and control of the spouse in whose nam e the deed appears.
In addition, even if property is separate property of one spouse, if the land is
homestead property, both spouses must sign the lease.

II.

THE EFFECTS OF RECORDING OR, SHOULD I RECORD ON A LEASE BY
LEASE BASIS OR WAIT UNTIL MY AREA IS SECURE AND FILE THEM
ALL AT ONCE?
Texas Property C ode §13.001 states that:
(a)

A conveyance of real property or an interest in real property or a
m ortgage or deed of trust is void as to a creditor or to a subsequent
purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice unless the
instrument has been acknowledged, sworn to, or proved, and filed for
record as required by law.

(b)

Th e unrecorded instrument is binding upon a party to the instrument,
upon the party’s heirs and upon a subsequent purchaser who does not
pay a valuable consideration or w ho has notice of the instrument.

Com pany landm en prefer to acquire substantial blocks of acreage and record
the leases all at once in order to preclude competitors from identifying their area of
interest as long as possible. Occasionally, a lessor from whom a company landman
has obtained a lease will execute a subsequent lease to a different company and this
different com pany will claim the status of a bona fide purchaser and assert the
protection offered in the statute quoted above, regardless of which lease is filed first.
Th e plain language of the statute, assuming the fact intensive elements of a
bona fide purchaser are present, supports the second lessor’s position, regardless
of filing date. It appears our statute is a pure “notice” statute. In other words, if the
first purchaser does not record before the sale to the second purchaser, the second
purchaser prevails (assuming he is an innocent purchaser for value) regardless of
who filed their instrument first and even if the second purchaser never files his
instrument. This is based on the theory that the first purchaser could prevent his loss
by promptly recording his instrument and is at fault for not doing so.
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The existing case law supports the pure notice interpretation. In Penny v.
Adams , 420 S.W .2d 820 (Crt. Civ. App. - Tyler, 1967, writ r e f'd), the facts were
essentially as follows:
(1)

A owned the lands.

(2)

By Royalty Deed dated September 1 9 , 1945, A conveyed to “B" a 1/2
non-participating royalty for 20 years and as long thereafter as
production was had. This deed was not filed for record until February
6, 1954.

(3)

By Deed dated February 11, 1954, A conveyed all her undivided
interest in the lands to “C". This deed was not filed until February 24,
1954.

(4)

“B" brings suit against “C" and his successors to recover the royalty
interest conveyed to him in the Deed dated Septem ber 19, 1945,
referenced above. There was apparently a producing well on this
property which would have perpetuated the term royalty interest.

At the trial court level, it was found that "C" had paid a valuable consideration
for the Deed executed on February 1 , 1954, and had no notice of the prior Deed from
“A” to “B" dated September 19, 1945. The trial court found “C" was an innocent
purchaser for value and rendered judgment that “B" take nothing.
W hile “B’s” point of appeal was that the deed to “C" was a quitclaim deed
(because it was only of “A ’s” undivided interest) and that “C" could not claim being
an innocent purchaser, the Tyler Appellate Court found that “C" was protected as a
bona fide purchaser and that “C” was an innocent purchaser for value. The trial
court’s judgment was sustained.
In another Tyler appellate case, Reposa v. Johnson , 693 S.W .2d 4 3 (Tex. Civ.
App. - Tyler, 1985, writ r e f'd, n.r.e.), the facts were essentially the sam e as above.
W hile the Appellate Court held in this case that “C”, the second purchaser, did not
sustain his burden of showing he was an innocent purchaser for value, the Court did
state that, if an affirmative finding had been made that “C" had paid a valuable
consideration without notice of the instrument vesting “B” with her title, it would mean
the conveyance to “C" would not have been affected by “B's” instrument and "C"
would have prevailed.
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A somewhat recent case re-visits the definition of a bona fide purchaser,
Colvin v. Alta Mesa Resources, Inc., 920 S .W .2d 688 (Tex. App. - Houston, First
District, 1996). A bona fide purchaser is one who m akes a good faith purchase of
real property for a valuable consideration without actual or constructive notice of an
outstanding equity or an adverse interest or title. The elements essential to a bona
fide purchaser purchase are (1) payment of valuable consideration; (2 ) absence of
notice; and (3) good faith. All of these elements are fact intensive and the failure of
any one will defeat the claim. W e could talk for days about the disputes that have
arisen under this statute because of the fact-intensive nature of these elem ents.
Most company landmen, when questioned by m anagem ent over the failure of
a lease due to this statute, will respond that occasional loss of an oil and gas lease
to a bona fide purchaser under this statute is preferable to recording leases
immediately and letting the registry readers compete from the date the first lease is
filed.

III.

OIL AND GAS LEASES FROM PARTIES IN REPRESENTATIVE
CAPACITIES
(A)

Receivership
(i)

Mineral Interests

In Texas, a person owning or claiming an undivided mineral interest in land,
or an undivided leasehold interest in land, can bring an action to appoint a receiver
to lease the mineral interest of a person who owns or claims an undivided mineral
interest in the same property. The defendant for whom the receiver is sought must
be a person whose residence or identity is unknown and has not paid taxes on their
interest during the five year period preceding the filing of the action. S e e Section
64.091, Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
The plaintiff in this action must allege and prove that he has m ade a diligent
but unsuccessful effort to locate the defendant and will suffer substantial dam age or
injury unless a receiver is appointed.
Notice of the lawsuit must be served on the defendant by publication in
accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Neither the applicant nor the
receiver is required to post bond.
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As ordered by the court, the receiver can execute and deliver to the lessee a
mineral lease on the outstanding undivided m ineral interest, execute an assignment
of the outstanding undivided leasehold interest and enter into a unitization
agreement authorized by the Texas Railroad Commission. Leases can contain
pooling clauses of no more than 160 acres for an oil well or 640 acres for a gas well,
each with a 10% tolerance, or into a unit that substantially conforms to a larger unit
prescribed or permitted by governmental rule. T h e m oney consideration paid for the
lease or assignment is paid into the registry of the District Clerk’s Office before the
receiver executes the instrument. Th e money is applied to the costs accruing in the
case and the balance, if any, is retained for the use and benefit of the defendant.
(ii)

Royalty Interests

Effective August 30, 1999, a receiver can be appointed for a royalty interest
owned by a non-resident or absent defendant in a tract of land. S ee Section 6 4 .0 9 3
of the Texas Civil Practice and R em edies Code. This statute is sim ilar to Section
64.091 discussed above but applies to a royalty interest. The R eceiver under this
statute, as ordered by the court, can ratify a mineral lease executed by a person
owning an undivided mineral interest in the property, ratify a pooling agreem ent
executed by a person owning an undivided mineral or leasehold interest in the
property or enter into a unitization agreem ent authorized by the Railroad
Commission of Texas.

(B)

Independent Administration

Texas Probate Code, Section 145, et seq, provides for the independent
administration of estates. The personal representative of the estate, known as the
Independent Executor, is generally free of court control. Independent administration
normally is found in estates where the decedent died testate but provisions in
Section 145 are made for those who died intestate.
Title is immediately vested in the devisees under a will or the heirs at law of
someone who dies intestate at the tim e of death; subject, however, to the paym ent
of the debts of the deceased and the paym ent of court-ordered child support
payments. Texas Probate Code, Section 37. However, the Independent Executor
has the authority to sell the property of the decedent to pay debts of the estate, even
without express authority in the will. Rowland v. Moore, 174 S .W .2d 24 8 (Tex. 1943).
An oil and gas lease creates a determ inable fee interest in the lessee and has long
been held by the Texas courts to be a sale of an interest in land. Cherokee W ater
Co. v. Forderhause, 641 S .W .2d 52 2 (Tex. 1982).
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PAGE 12

A question arises as to whether an Independent Executor has the authority to
execute an oil and gas lease which binds the estate after all debts had been paid.
Under the case of Dallas Services v. Broadmoor, 634 S.W.2d 572 (Tex.Civ.App. Dallas, 1982, r e f'd n.r.e.) and Section 188 of the Texas Probate Code, a lessee who
is an innocent purchaser, in good faith for a valuable consideration and without
notice of any illegality in the title, of an oil and gas lease from an Independent
Executor during an administration is protected so long as the estate has not been
closed.
(C)

Dependent A d m in istra tio n

Sections 367 and 368 of the Texas Probate Code give the procedures for
obtaining an oil and gas lease subject to a dependent administration. This is the
usual situation where someone dies intestate and there is an administration had on
their estate.
(i)

Section 367

An oil and gas lease can be obtained from a personal representative of an
estate after an application has been filed as provided for in Section 367(c)1. Upon
the filing of the application, the clerk is required to immediately call the filing of same
to the court and the judge shall designate the time and place fo r hearing of the
application. The personal representative, and not the county clerk, shall give notice
in writing of the time designated by the Judge for the hearing on the application. The
requirements of this notice are contained in Section 367(c)3(a). The personal
representative shall give at least 10 days notice, exclusive of the date of notice and
of the date set for hearing, by publication in one issue of a newspaper of general
circulation in a county where the proceeding is pending. The above steps are
mandatory in any order entered in the absence of these requirements is null and
void. A hearing is then held and an appropriate order must be entered by the court.
Section 367 of the Texas Probate Code is rarely used because of Section 368.
(ii)

Section 368

Provides that the court may authorize the making of an oil and gas lease at
private sale (without public notice or advertising) if the court is of the opinion that
sufficient facts are set out in the application to show that it would be more
advantageous to the estate that a lease be made privately and without compliance
of the mandatory requirements referenced above.
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At any time after the expiration of 5 days, and prior to expiration of 10 days
from the date of filing the application, and without an order setting the time and place
for a hearing, the court shall hear the application to lease. If it is satisfied the lease
will be made for a fair and sufficient consideration and on fair terms, and that it will
be made in conformity with law, the court shall enter an order authorizing the
execution of such lease without the necessity of advertising, notice or citation. No
order confirming the lease made at private sale need be issued. However, the lease
will not be valid until the increased order additional bond required by the court, if
any, has been approved by the court or filed with the clerk of the court.
Any lease authorized under either Section 367 or 368 of the Texas Probate
Code shall have a primary term of no more than 5 years, subject to the terms and
provisions of the lease extending it beyond the primary term by paying production,
by bona fide drilling or reworking operations, whether in or on the same or additional
well or wells, with no cessation of operations of more than 60 consecutive days
before production is restored or obtained, or by the provisions of the lease relating
to a shut-in gas well.
(D)

Sale o f P ro perty o f a M in o r by a P a re n t W ith o u t G u a rd ia n s h ip

When the net value of a minor’s interest in real or personal property in an
estate does not exceed $50,000.00, a natural or adoptive parent, or the managing
conservator, of a minor who is not a ward, may apply to the court for an order to sell
the real property of a minor in an estate without being appointed guardian. Section
889 of the Texas Probate Code.
The contents of the application are set forth in Section 889(b). On receipt of
the application, the court shall set the application for hearing at a date not earlier
than 5 days from the date of the filing of the application. If the court is satisfied that
the sale is in the best interest of the minor, the court shall order the sale of the
property. The proceeds of the sale belonging to the minor are deposited in the court
registry.
Section 890 of the Texas Probate Code governs the sale of property of a ward
who has a guardian of the person but not a guardian of an estate. The requirements
are substantially similar to Section 889.
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(E)

T ru s te e s

Unless the term s of the trust provide otherwise, Section 113.012 of the Texas
Property Code (and a part of the T e xas Trust Code) sets out a broad range of
mineral transactions the trustee is authorized to enter into. This includes the power
to m ake oil and gas leases, with pooling and unitization clauses, including the right
to execute such a lease extending beyond the term of the trust.
If a conveyance is to a blind trustee with no identification of the trust or
disclosure of the beneficiaries, the person designated as Trustee can convey the
property without subsequent question by a person who claims to be a beneficiary of
the trust. S e e Section 101.001 and Section 114.082 of the Texas Property Code.
(F)

A tto rn e y -in -F a c ts u n d e r P o w e r o f A ttorneys

Section 4 9 0 of the T e x a s Probate Code sets out a statutory durable power of
attorney form. This form is attached and is the form in effect since Septem ber 1,
1997. If no power listed is crossed out, it is interpreted as a general power of
attorney. Section 4 9 2 deals with construction of powers relating to real property
transactions. These specifically include the power to enter into an oil and gas lease
and making pooling and unitization agreem ents. Prior to Septem ber 1, 1997, the
statute authorizing real estate transactions w as valid for a conveyance of real
property and authorized agents to otherwise “grant options concerning ... or
otherwise dispose of an estate or interest in real property ....” A question existed
as to w hether the form authorized oil and gas transactions, especially if the form was
executed to only grant specific powers and w as not a general power of attorney.
It should be noted that a non-durable power of attorney or a durable power of
attorney that does not substantially conform to this form, does not benefit from this
provision. Th ese forms should be looked at carefully to determine if they allow
authority to execute oil and gas leases, with pooling provisions. W e do have an
early case of Bean v. Bean, 79 S .W .2 d 65 2 (Tex.Civ.App. - Texarkana 1935, writ
re f d) which held that a pow er of attorney which gave authority to “sell” land did not
include the power to convey m inerals by either a deed or lease.
Section 4 8 9 of the P ro b ate C od e requires that a durable power of attorney
requiring the execution of an instrument to be recorded, including an oil and gas
lease, shall be recorded in the County Clerk’s Office where the land is located.
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IV.

LIM ITA TIO N S

Most, if not all states, have statutes which can be utilized in curing title defects
or eliminating title requirements. These statutes are a practical necessity. The
curative statutes regularly utilized by title examiners in Texas include the following:
(A)

Section 16.033 of th e Texas Civil P ractice and R em edies C od e

Technical Defects in Instruments
(i)
A person with a right of action for the recovery of real property
conveyed by an instrument with one of the following defects must bring
suit not later than four years after the day the instrument was recorded
with the county clerk of the county where the real property is located:
(a)

lack of the signature of a proper corporate officer, partner,
or company officer, manager, or member;

(b)

lack of a corporate seal;

(c)

failure of the record to show the corporate seal used;

(d)

failure of the record to show authority of the board of
directors or stockholders of a corporation, partners of a
partnership, or officers, managers or members of a
company;

(e)

execution and delivery of the instrument by a corporation,
partnership, or other company that had been dissolved,
whose charter had expired, or whose franchise had been
canceled, withdrawn or forfeited;

(f)

acknowledgment of the instrument in an individual, rather
than a representative or official, capacity;

(g)

execution of the instrument by a trustee without record of
the authority of the trustee or proof of the facts recited in
the instrument;
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(ii)
(B)

(h)

failure of the record or instrument to show an
acknowledgment or jurat that complies with applicable
law; or,

(i)

wording of the stated consideration that may or might
create an implied lien in favor of the grantor.

This section does not apply to a forged instrument.

S e c tio n 160.35 o f The T exas Civil Practice And R em edies C ode

Lien on Real Property
(i)

A person must bring suit for the recovery of real property under
a real property lien or the foreclosure of a real property lien not
later than four years after the day the cause of action accrues.

(ii)

A sale of real property under a power of sale in a mortgage or
deed of trust that creates a real property lien must be made not
later than four years after the day the cause of action accrues.

(iii)

The running of the statute of limitations is not suspended against
a bona fide purchaser for value a lienholder, or a lessee who
has no notice or knowledge of the suspension of the limitations
period and who acquires an interest in the property when a cause
of action on an outstanding real property lien has accrued for
more than four years, except as provided by:

(iv)

(1)

Section 16.062, providing for suspension in the event of
death; and,

(2)

Section 16.036, providing for recorded extensions of real
property liens.

On the expiration of the four-your limitations period, the real
property lien and a power of sale to enforce the real property lien
become void.
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(v)

If a series of notes or obligations of a note or obligation payable
in installments is secured by a real property lien, the four-year
limitations period does not begin to run until the maturity date of
the last note, obligation, or installment.

(vi)

The limitations period under this section is not affected by
Section 3.118, Business & Commerce Code.

(vii)

In this section, “real property lien” means:
(1)

a superior title retained by a vendor in a deed of
conveyance or a purchase money note; or

(2)

a vendor’s lien, a mortgage, a deed of trust, a voluntary
mechanic’s lien, or a voluntary materialman’s lien on real
estate, securing a note or other written obligation.

The foregoing limitation statute can be suspended by a proper written
agreement. The maturity date in the original instrument or the extension is the
conclusive evidence of the maturity date of the debt or obligation.
V.

LIENS

A very common problem encountered in determining mineral ownership in a
tract of land concerns the issue of whether a lien foreclosure has wiped out
intervening or prior mineral sales.
(A)

Deed of Trust Foreclosure

The most common situation concerns the deed of trust foreclosure. For
example, say “A” owns Blackacre and executes a valid deed of trust covering this
land to “B”. “A” then conveys an undivided 1/2 mineral interest in Blackacre to “C”.
If “B” forecloses under the deed of trust in accordance with law, a sale of this type
does eliminate the intervening mineral sale.
However, say “A” owns fee simple title to Blackacre. “A” then executes a deed
of trust covering said land to “B”. Subsequently, “A” conveys an undivided 1/2
mineral interest in Blackacre to “C”. Subsequently, “A” determines that he cannot pay
the mortgage and conveys Blackacre to “B” for the stated consideration of
satisfaction of the original debt. Note that this is not a foreclosure under a deed of
trust but a deed executed in extinguishment of the debt. In this situation, the Texas
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courts holds that such a deed does not wipe out the intervening mineral sale to “C”.
See Flag-Redfern Oil Company v. Humble Exploration Company, Inc., 774 S.W.2d
6 (Tex. 1987). In the Flag-Redfern case, supra, the Court noted that Texas had
always followed the lien theory of mortgages. In other words, when a mortgagor
executes a deed of trust, the legal and equitable estates in the property are severed.
The mortgagor retains the legal title and the mortgagee holds the equitable title.
After the deed of trust, “A” would still be vested with the legal title and “B” would be
vested with the equitable title. When “A” conveyed the undivided 1/2 mineral interest
to “C” , it conveyed in fee simple the legal estate to an undivided 1/2 of the minerals.
When “A” subsequently conveyed the property to “B”, the Court held that “A” did not
hold the legal title to the 1/2 mineral interest as it had conveyed that estate to “C”
and therefore, could not covey this legal title in 1/2 of them minerals back to “B”.
The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals had erred in labeling the
“A” to “C” deed a “deed in lieu of foreclosure” and that there is no such deed as a
deed in lieu of foreclosure. It held that the deed was a warranty deed with the stated
consideration being the cancellation and delivery of the note held by “C”.
(B)

V e n d o r’s Lien And Recission

Vendor’s lien and recission cases can present a very sticky problem. You have
to get all your facts straight in order to know exactly where you stand.
Let us assume “A ” owns Blackacre in fee simple and sells the land to “B” for
$10.00 and receives $5.00 in cash and a $5.00 vendor’s lien note. The deed recites
that the vendor’s lien is retained to secure the payment of the debt. The Texas courts
basically hold that this is an executory contract that ripens into title in the grantee
when the remaining money has been paid. “B” then sells an undivided 1/2 mineral
interest to “C”. Later, it is determined that “B” cannot pay the vendor’s lien note and
he reconveys the land to “A” in cancellation of the vendor’s lien note. The courts hold
that this is a recission and “C’”s mineral interest is wiped out by the deed. See
Whiteside v. Bell, 347 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. 1961).
If “A ” was not able to obtain a reconveyance from “B” but had to bring a lawsuit
against “B” to foreclose his lien and get his title back, is “C” a necessary party to the
suit? No. if “A” brings suit only against “B” and obtains the land back, “C”’s mineral
interest is again wiped out because he is not a necessary party. I want to emphasize
that this must be a vendor’s lien transaction because it involves an executory
transaction and superior legal title remains in “A”.
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One thing you should be aware of is that the mineral buyer, “C”, is not left
without a remedy in a situation where “B” reconveys the land back to “A” under a
vendor’s lien situation. “C” has an equitable right of redemption and he can go back
to the original landowner, tender the amount due and recover the title provided that
he acts within a reasonable length of time. The only case I could find as to what was
a reasonable time was the Whiteside case, supra, wherein the mineral buyer came
back 27 years later. The court held that he did not come in within a reasonable
amount of time and was barred by the operation of laches from redeeming his
mineral interest.
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A PPEN D IX I
STATUTORY DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY
NOTICE: THE POWERS GRANTED BY THIS DOCUMENT ARE BROAD AND
SWEEPING. THEY ARE EXPLAINED IN THE DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY
ACT, CHAPTER XII, TEXAS PROBATE CODE. IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS
ABOUT THESE POWERS, OBTAIN COMPETENT LEGAL ADVICE. THIS
DOCUMENT DOES NOT AUTHORIZE ANYONE TO MAKE MEDICAL AND OTHER
HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS FOR YOU. YOU MAY REVOKE THIS POWER OF
ATTORNEY IF YOU LATER WISH TO DO SO.
I, (insert your name and address), appoint (insert the name and address of the
person appointed), as my agent (attorney-in-fact) to act for me in any lawful way with
respect to all of the following powers except for a power that I have crossed out
below.
TO WITHHOLD A POWER, YOU MUST CROSS OUT EACH POWER
WITHHELD.
Real property transactions;
Tangible personal property transactions;
Stock and bond transactions;
Commodity and option transactions;
Banking and other financial institution transactions;
Business operating transactions;
Insurance and annuity transactions;
Estate, trust, and other beneficiary transactions;
Claims and litigation;
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Personal and family maintenance;
Benefits from social security, Medicare, -Medicaid, or other governmental
programs or civil or military service;
Retirement plan transactions;
Tax matters.
IF NO POWER LISTED ABOVE IS CROSSED OUT, THIS DOCUMENT
SHALL BE CONSTRUED AND INTERPRETED AS A GENERAL POWER OF
ATTORNEY AND MY AGENT (ATTORNEY IN FACT) SHALL HAVE THE POWER
AND AUTHORITY TO PERFORM OR UNDERTAKE ANY ACTION I COULD
PERFORM OR UNDERTAKE IF I WERE PERSONALLY PRESENT.
S P E C IA L IN S T R U C T IO N S :

Special instructions applicable to gifts (initial in front of the following sentence
to have it apply):
I grant my agent (attorney in fact) the power to apply my property to make
gifts, except that the amount of a gift to an individual may not exceed the amount of
annual exclusions allowed from the federal gift tax for the calendar year of the gift.
ON THE FOLLOWING LINES YOU MAY GIVE SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS
LIMITING OR EXTENDING THE POWERS GRANTED TO YOUR AGENT.

UNLESS YOU DIRECT OTHERWISE ABOVE, THIS POWER OF
ATTORNEY IS EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY AND W ILL CONTINUE UNTIL IT IS
REVOKED.
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CHOOSE ONE OF THE FOLLOWING ALTERNATIVES BY CROSSING OUT
THE ALTERNATIVE NOT CHOSEN:
(A)

This power of attorney is not affected by my subsequent disability or
incapacity.

(B)

This power of attorney becomes effective upon my disability or
incapacity.

YOU SHOULD CHOOSE ALTERNATIVE (A) IF THIS POWER OF
ATTORNEY IS TO BECOME EFFECTIVE ON THE DATE IT IS EXECUTED.
IF NEITHER (A) NOR (B) IS CROSSED OUT, IT WILL BE ASSUMED THAT
YOU CHOSE ALTERNATIVE (A).
If Alternative (B) is chosen and a definition of my disability or incapacity is not
contained in this power of attorney, I shall be considered disabled or incapacitated
for purposes of this power of attorney if a physician certifies in writing at a date later
than the date this power of attorney is executed that, based on the physician’s
medical examination of me, I am mentally incapable of managing my financial
affairs. I authorize the physician who examines me for this purpose to disclose my
physical or mental condition to another person for purposes of this power of attorney.
A third party who accepts this power of attorney is fully protected from any action
taken under this power of attorney that is based on the determination made by a
physician of my disability or incapacity.
I agree that any third party who receives a copy of this document may act
under it. Revocation of the durable power of attorney is not effective as to a third
party until the third party receives actual notice of the revocation. I agree to
indemnify the third party for any claims that arise against the third party because of
reliance on this power of attorney.
If any agent named by me dies, becomes legally disabled, resigns, or refuses
to act, I name the following (each to act alone and successively, in the order named)
as successor(s) to that agent:____________________________________
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Signed this_____ day o f______________________ , 2001.

STATE OF TEXAS

§

COUNTY OF

§

This document was acknowledged before me on th e __day o f __________ ,
2001, by

Notary Public, State of Texas

THE ATTORNEY IN FACT OR AGENT, BY ACCEPTING OR ACTING UNDER THE
APPOINTMENT, ASSUMES THE FIDUCIARY AND OTHER LEGAL
RESPONSIBILITIES OF AN AGENT.

STATUTORY DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY

PAGE 4

